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Introduction
The Federal Circuit's development of nonobviousness
jurisprudence since 1982 has, for the most part, been a boon to
inventors. The inclusion of secondary factors for determining
nonobviousness has mitigated the sometimes harsh results of the
Supreme Court's more formal three-part test of novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness. However, inconsistent standards employed by the
Federal Circuit and the district courts have created a measure of
uncertainty that may handicap the individual inventor and
entrepreneur. In particular, the elevation of commercial success to the
level of prime factor for determining patentability may result in small
market-share inventors losing patent protection, and may create
economic disincentives for technological innovation. Ultimately, the
elevation of commercial success to primary importance threatens to
swallow the whole nonobviousness requirement.
I
Background
The Patent Act of 1793 required that an invention must embody
novelty and utility in order to obtain a patent.' In 1952, Congress
added a third statutory requirement of nonobviousness? This third
statutory requirement for patentability is found within 35 U.S.C.
section 103, which states:
A patent may not be obtained, though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made.3
An invention that is both novel and useful is thus not patentable if
it is obvious in light of the prior art.' The Patent and Trademark
Office will therefore deny a patent for an invention that represents an
apparent or intuitive advance over the prior art regardless of whether
1. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). The novelty and utility requirements appear in the 1952 Act as
§§ 101 and 102.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
4. See generally Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit's Patent Nonobviousness
Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1051 (1991).
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the invention satisfies the requirements of novelty (§ 101) or utility
(§ 102).5 The 1952 Patent Act was intended to clarify and solidify the
judicially created nonobviousness doctrine that had existed since
1850.6
Since the 1952 Patent Act, the courts have further fleshed out the
nonobviousness requirement.7 The United States Supreme Court laid
out a three-part test, known as the Graham test, for applying § 103:
first, "the scope and content of the prior art are .. . determined;
8
second, the differences between the prior art and the invention in
question are ascertained;9 third, the level of "ordinary skill" in that art
is examined.10 The nonobviousness of the subject matter is then set
against this factual background."
II
The Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act. ' It serves as a specialized appellate court to handle
patent cases.'3 The lower courts, and in particular, the Federal
Circuit,'4 have further elaborated standards for determining
nonobviousness. By the end of the Federal Circuit's first decade, in
5. Id. at 1052.
6. The seminal nonobviousness case is Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248
(1850). At that time, the concept of nonobviousness was referred to as "invention." Learned
Hand summed up the frustrating elusiveness of the doctrine of invention on the eve of the 1952
Patent Act, stating that the term invention is "as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a
phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts." Harries v. Air King Prods., Co.,
183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).
7. The Supreme Court standard up until the 1952 Act remained that advancements must
be the result of "inventive genius." Eltra Corp. v. Basic, Inc., 599 F.2d 745, 751 (6th Cir.
1979)(citing Great A&P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)).
8. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 17. John Deere had invented a hinged plow shank which prevented a plow blade
from being damaged when it hit rocks. The Court found that a hinged plow was obvious in light
of the scope and content of the prior art. Id.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
13. "The process of unifying patent appellate jurisdiction was completed by merging
together the Court of Claims (Ct. Cl.) and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.)." Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in the Federal Circuit
Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231,1232 (1994).
14. "The Federal Circuit has . . .dramatically increased the role of secondary
considerations of nonobviousness." Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1075.
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1992, the court had laid out a distinct body of decisional law relating to
nonobviousness.15
Two main approaches to the role played by secondary factors in
determining nonobviousness have emerged.'6 The first approach, that
of the Supreme Court, is that secondary factors come into play only
when nonobviousness is not determinable from the three Graham
factors. 7 The second approach, that developed by the Federal Circuit,
is that secondary factors, particularly, commercial success, must always
be considered when present'8 and are often given greater weight than
any other consideration.'9 The latter approach has become the
authoritative one, since the Supreme Court has reviewed Federal
Circuit decisions only on rare occasions.' The Supreme Court appears
content, for the most part, to defer to the Federal Circuit. 21
Nevertheless, inconsistencies remain both at the patent appeal stage
and in patent infringement litigation.21 The formalistic standard,
represented by the Supreme Court cases, is almost universally
considered by commentators to be more hostile to inventors than the
Federal Circuit's approach. A higher standard better serves the goal of
preventing patents from capturing knowledge already in the public
domain.' However, the more flexible approach of the Federal Circuit
can achieve that goal equally well. Nothing inherent in commercial
success analysis suggests that such an approach would lead to
patenting knowledge in the public domain. On the contrary, if the
15. Michel, supra note 13, at 1231-33.
16. Dorothy Whelan, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in Applying the
Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REV. 357, 358 (1987).
17. Id. at 358. The Supreme Court, in contrast with subsequent Federal Circuit decisions,
has held that secondary considerations cannot overcome a determination of obviousness based
on the analysis of the prior art. See, e.g., Anderson's-Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396
U.S. 57, 62-63 (1969)(holding when prior art indicates obviousness, commercial success does not
establish nonobviousness).
18. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530,1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
19. See Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1068-76. "The Federal Circuit ... has dramatically
increased the role of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. The court has completely
abandoned the Supreme Court's view that such evidence is useful merely to tip the balance in
close cases." Id. at 1075.
20. Id. at 1055 n.22.
21. Whelan, supra note 16, at 359.
22. See, e.g., Kathleen N. McKereghan, The Nonobviousness of Inventions: In Search of a
Functional Standard, 66 WASH. L. REv. 1061, 1065 (1991)("Frequent litigation of nonobviousness
reflects the importance and inaccuracy of the present tests for the requirement."). McKereghan
advocates the adoption of the formalistic approach to nonobviousness and argues that all courts
should adopt the stricter Supreme Court standard. Id. at 1062.
23. Id. at 1064.
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rationale underlying commercial success is correct, that it implies a
failed attempt by others to solve the same problem, then the
formalistic approach of the Supreme Court affords no advantage in
that regard.
ill
The Use of Inconsistent Standards Leads to Unpredictability
The result of the conflicting judicially-developed standards
surrounding nonobviousness, which has become the key requirement
for patentability, is confusion and uncertainty.? Initially, the Graham
test proved difficult for judges to implement.' Courts experienced
difficulty in applying the nonobviousness test because many of the
judges lacked the technological and scientific expertise sufficient to
wade into complex patent litigation, and because of the difficulty of
assessing, in hindsight, whether a claimed invention would have been
obvious when it was made.26
This uncertainty comes at a price. A key component of a
successful patent law system is that all persons thereby affected know
their rights and obligations as early on in the process as possible.'
Doctrinal clarity, 28 and predictability,29 are essential components of a
well functioning systemY° Unpredictability harms not only potential
litigants, but also others in the industry. Individual inventors may
decline to disclose an invention to the public via the patent process for
fear of litigation or lack of patent protection. The incentive to file for
24. See generally JOHN F. WITHERSPOON, NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF
PATENTABILITY (1980). This volume is a collection of essays concerning the history and difficulties
posed by the nonobviousness requirement, presented for the most part from an advocate's point
of view.
25. See, e.g., Michel, supra note 13, at 1240. "[T]he quadri-partite test of Graham v. John
Deere Co. can sometimes bewilder judges in its actual application." Id. Moreover, while the four
factors under the fourth part of the test, such as "commercial success" are purportedly objective,
the question of what an inventor of ordinary skill would have invented is subjective and elusive.
"I pity the poor juror!" Id. at 1241. The Supreme Court itself hoped for a better result stating,
"[wie believe that the strict observance of the requirements laid down here will result in that
uniformity and definiteness which Congress called for in the 1952 Act." Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
26. Whelan, supra note 16, at 357.
27. Michel, supra note 13, at 1233.
28. "Doctrinal clarity" is used here to mean the clear articulation of rules of law.
29. "Predictability" is used here to mean the ability to forecast accurately the outcome of
potential litigation through clearly stated legal principles.
30. Michel, supra note 13, at 1233.
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patent protection is thus diminished, depriving the public of the
benefit of early disclosure."
The Federal Circuit's standards have not mitigated the problem
of uncertainty; in fact, they have compounded it.' An examination of
the Federal Circuit's standards reveals that, despite a more "pro-
patent" approach,33 inconsistencies in articulating and applying those
standards create a dangerous environment for the individual inventor.
IV
Secondary Considerations
The inconsistent application of secondary factors, and the
inconsistent weight accorded to them, has led to an increased
uncertainty for patent applicants and patent holders, thus diminishing
the value of seeking a patent. The Supreme Court first espoused the
use of "secondary considerations" in determining nonobviousness in
Graham.' As developed by the courts, these secondary factors include
commercial success, extent of licensing, immediate copying by
competitors, the failure of others to make the same invention, and the
long-felt need for the invention. 5 The Court in Graham recommended
the use of secondary considerations for three reasons: first, they are
more susceptible to judicial interpretation because they are non-
technical; second, they may lead to a more predictable and stable
nonobviousness doctrine because they are objective, not subjective;
and third, they may reduce the use of hindsight. 6
31. Id. at 1241. Both patentees and their competitors must be able to ascertain their rights
and liabilities in advance. This requires legal rules that foster predictability. The assurance of
non-liability must outweigh the risk of liability and related damages or the competitor will cease
to offer the public better devices. The "shifting border" of inconsistent decisions becomes
"potentially paralyzing." Id. at 1242-43.
32. Id. at 1239. Patent invalidity based on obviousness has become less certain as the
Federal Circuit has decided more cases because the court gives little priority to the goal of
predictability.
33. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 816 (1988).
34. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The Court stated that the secondary
factors "may have relevancy." Id. at 18. Gradually, the subjunctive "may have relevancy" has
evolved into an affirmative standard where the secondary factors shall be considered relevant.
35. See Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1000 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 905 (1986)(finding patent of design for a sailboard boom valid). Copying the claimed
invention is indicative of nonobviousness. Id. Providing a solution to a long-existing problem is
another type of objective evidence useful in determining nonobviousness. Id.
36. Graham, 383 U.S. at 36. See also, Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1056 n.27. The Court of
Claims echoed the sentiment that secondary considerations, such as commercial success, serve
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 19:199
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The Federal Circuit has not only expanded the range of secondary
considerations, but has also greatly increased the importance of
secondary factors in nonobviousness analysis.' One hoped-for benefit
of the use of secondary considerations was that they would simplify
the nonobviousness inquiry for judges unschooled in technical fields
8
However, the inconsistencies in application of those standards have
created an uncertainty for inventors which offsets any benefit derived
by the courts.
In addition, the Federal Circuit's elevation of commercial success
to the primary factor in establishing nonobviousness threatens to
swallow the entire requirement of nonobviousness. This is so because
none of the other factors is given consideration in such a calculus.
V
Commercial Success is the Paramount Secondary Consideration
Of the various secondary considerations employed by the Federal
Circuit, commercial success is the most important and most widely
employed.' Problems arise, however, when courts apply those
secondary factors in an inconsistent fashion.4°
The rationale behind the use of commercial success to determine
nonobviousness is that an inventor is induced to attempt a solution to
a problem where there is potential for market success. 41 If success is
obtained, it can be inferred that others attempted, but failed, to solve
to "guard against slipping into use of hindsight." In re Grout, 377 F.2d 1019, 1023 (Ct. Cl.
1967)(citation omitted).
37. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1075. "The Federal Circuit therefore has dramatically
increased the role of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. The court has completely
abandoned the Supreme Court's view that such evidence is useful merely to tip the balance in
close cases." Id. See also Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir.
1983). Commercial success is always to be considered, "not just when the decisionmaker remains
in doubt after viewing the art." Id. at 1539.
38. Whelan, supra note 16, at 366.
39. See generally Robert Desmond, Nothing Seems "Obvious" to the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit: The Federal Circuit, Unchecked by the Supreme Court, Transforms the
Standard of Obviousness under the Patent Law, 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 455,478-80 (1993).
40. The Supreme Court had hoped that "strict observance" of the Graham requirements
would lead to the uniformity and definiteness intended by Congress in enacting the 1952 Patent
Act. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
41. Edward P. Walker, Objective Evidence of Nonobviousness: The Elusive Nexus
Requirement, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 175, 188 (1987).
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the problem.5 Such a solution must not have been obvious to
contemporary inventors of ordinary skill.43
Some commentators have suggested that commercial success is
not relevant to the application of section 103 because commercial
success does not constitute evidence of the actions of researchers and
inventors actually involved in the field at the time of discovery.' In
this analysis, the rationale for application of commercial success
factors is doubly flawed. "First, there is no basis for inferring the
failure of others from the commercial success of the patentee's
solution."'' Second, the argument that the patentee's success was
primarily a result of the merits of the claimed features is
unreasonable.' However, the Federal Circuit does not assume that
commercial success is due primarily to the merits of the claimed
features. Rather, it requires the patentee to make a showing of a
sufficient nexus between the claimed features and the product's
success.47 This requirement of a showing of nexus places an extra
burden on the patentee.
Consideration of commercial success permits courts to look at
evidence outside the intrinsic features of the invention and to focus on
the post-invention commercialization of the product.' While allowing
the court readily discernible and tangible evidence of the
marketplace's reaction to the invention, extrinsic inquiry must, by
definition, look away from the invention itself. A danger arises when
the ease of the extrinsic evaluation overshadows the inherent merits of
the product and the process by which it was invented. While process-
based inquiry has not played a significant role in nonobviousness
jurisprudence, it is implied by the statutory emphasis on obviousness
to a reasonable inventor "at the time the invention was made."'49
42. Id. at 188. See also Whelan, supra note 16, at 369. Commercial success, the theory goes,
supports an inference that others attempted to find a solution to a defect in an existing device or
process but failed. Id.
43. Walker, supra note 41, at 188.
44. Whelan, supra note 16, at 377.
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. Id. (citation omitted).
47. Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985).
48. See Merges, supra note 33, at 819.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
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However, consideration of the objective secondary factors has long
prevailed over the notion of subjectivity at the time of invention.
50
Beginning in 1982, the Federal Circuit started to elevate the once-
secondary consideration of commercial success to the level of a
primary factor equal to or greater than the other three factual prongs
of the Graham test.51 To exclude consideration of commercial success
is now reversible error.
52
For example, in W.L. Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc.,s the
Federal Circuit reversed a district court's denial of a patent for
Goretex. The district court found that the evidence of obviousness
under the Graham test overwhelmed any secondary factors.? The
Federal Circuit reversed on the basis of the commercial success of the
product.55 The consequence of this decision was to elevate commercial
success to the level of the Supreme Court's primary factors as stated in
Graham, and even supersede them in importance, since commercial
success trumped the Graham factors the district court had relied on to
invalidate the patent.
Subsequent decisions by the Federal Circuit have borne out the
theory that commercial success has been raised to the level of a
primary, or even the prime, factor.5 One year after Gore, the court
again overturned a decision where the lower court examined
50. This is embodied by the text of the statute and suggested by the primary factors of
Graham, particularly the aspect of what was obvious at the time of invention to a reasonable
inventor of ordinary skill. See A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the
Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097 (1989).
51. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 447 (Fed. Cir.
1986)(citing objective evidence of secondary considerations as fourth factual inquiry in the
Graham test).
52. See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983). "It is
jurisprudentially inappropriate to disregard any relevant evidence on any issue in any case." Id.
at 1538.
53. 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). This decision came in
the Federal Circuit's first year, and significantly, the Supreme Court denied certiorari despite the
Federal Circuit's reversal of a decision that relied explicitly on the Graham test. The Court's lack
of alarm at-or, more strongly, acquiescence to-the direction the Federal Circuit steered
nonobviousness jurisprudence is demonstrated by the rarity of grants of certiorari in such cases.
Merges, supra note 33, at 827.
54. Id. at 1555.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocare, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 443 (Fed.
Cir. 1986). Bausch & Lomb sued for patent infringement. Id. at 444. The trial court invalidated
the patent for obviousness. Id. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, because the lower
court failed to consider secondary considerations. Id. at 446. Secondary considerations, the
"objective indicia of obviousness," must always be considered. Id. at 450.
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secondary factors, holding that secondary factors alone cannot
overturn the Graham test.' Eventually, the district courts themselves
adopted the Federal Circuit's view of the importance of secondary
factors.' "Such 'secondary considerations,' when present, must always
be considered." 59
Since failure to consider applicable secondary factors constitutes
reversible error,' failure to consider the lack of commercial success as
an indication of commercial success is a fortiori reversible error.
Consequently, every invention must be considered in the light of
commercial success, no matter how nonobvious it might otherwise be.
VI
The Commercial Success Nexus
Since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, appeals from the
district courts are rarely reviewed by the Supreme Court.61
Consequently, the Federal Circuit's approach takes on increased
importance not only regarding the finality of its own decisions, but
also as a lodestar for all district courts reviewing patent cases. Other
federal courts also consider commercial success the most important of
the secondary factors, also raising it to the level of a primary factor.6
As a result, commercial success has become a greater factor in both
patent application appeals and in private challenges to invalidate
patents."
Frequently, commercial success turns out to be the decisive factor
in decisions regarding the grant of patents or in patent litigation.
64
57. Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc, 739 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985).
58. See, e.g., Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA, 808 F.2d 1490, 1498-1500 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987)(approving district court's extensive consideration of secondary
factors in validating patent).
59. Bausch & Lomb, 796 F.2d at 450 (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d
1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983))(emphasis added).
60. Bausch & Lomb, 796 F.2d at 450.
61. See Desmond, supra note 39, at 464. The Supreme Court heard only two patent cases in
the first ten years after formation of the Federal Circuit. Id.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co, 810 F.2d 1561, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987). The district court had found that the invention was obvious based
on secondary factors. The Federal Circuit reversed predominantly on the strength of the
product's enormous commercial success.
64. Id. See also Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1092 (Fed. Cir.
1987). In Allen Archery, the Federal Circuit found evidence of the invention's commercial
[VOL. 19:199H-ASTINGS Coum/ENTr LJ.
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When appealing the denial of a patent application on the grounds of
obviousness, the patentee must show the product's sales in relation to
other products. That is, the patentee must show a significant market
share. Raw sales alone, however, are not sufficient indicia of
commercial success.' Where a company has had runaway sales success
with a new product, a showing of raw sales will not be difficult to
make.66 On the other hand, the individual inventor often has little
marketing muscle. Although the product may meet all the statutory
and Graham requirements, if the product is not immediately successful
in grabbing a significant market share, the inventor is at risk of losing
patent protection.'
The patentee must further demonstrate a link between the
commercial success and the product's patented features. 68 It is
insufficient that the product's success be due to commercial factors-
such as preexisting market share, distribution, or advertising-
unrelated to its degree of invention. This link is known as the
commercial success "nexus. ' ' 9
The commercial success nexus carries a great deal of weight-
more, in fact, than claims that evidence of nonobviousness can only be
considered when the invention solves a long-existing problem or
success to be decisive in denying the challenger's attempt to prove that the patenteet invention
was obvious. Id.
65. See Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The court
ruled that raw sales, even as a percentage of total revenues, were insufficient to show commercial
success. Id. Instead, the patentee must show the product's sales in terms of market share. Id.
66. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co, 774 F.2d 1082, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The
sales of the company's plastic cable ties reached $50 million, and the Federal Circuit found this
evidence of commercial success to be of surpassing importance, reversing the district court's
finding of obviousness under the Graham standard. Id.
67. C.f. id. In Panduit, the runaway success of the product led the court to elevate the
importance of commercial success. However, in the case of a genuinely innovative product that
was not well-marketed and had no such success, the patent protection offered the inventor may
be slim indeed. Id.
68. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983)("nexus is
required between the merits of the claimed invention and the evidence offered").
69. Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied
477 U.S. 905 (1986). AMF, the patent challenger, argued that Windsurfing (WSI) enjoyed
commercial success due to sales of accessories unrelated to the patented features and its
extensive promotional effort. In other words, AMF claimed that there was no nexus between the
claimed features and the product's success. The court, in determining the commercial success
nexus, reviewed the objective evidence, and sought a nexus between WSIt commercial success
and the merits of the claimed invention. Id. at 999. The court concluded that the commercial
success was "well beyond the effect" of WSI's promotional and advertising efforts, and that the
invention was therefore nonobvious. Id. at 1000.
when the invention is copied (both secondary factors).' The nexus
has been established as the "sine qua non of objective criteria of
nonobviousness."71 The nexus requirement is a softening of the
previous "positively clear" standard. Consequently, the nexus
approach should normally yield a more favorable result to the
inventor when such a nexus can be established to counter claims of
failure to satisfy one of the other factual prongs.' Under a strictly
applied Graham analysis, such a failure would be fatal to the patent.7
This nexus showing, however, is much more difficult to make in
practice than it sounds in theory.74
VII
Inconsistent Standards for Finding a Sufficient Commercial
Success Nexus
The lowered scrutiny that the commercial nexus approach
provides results in significant advantage to the inventor. It is widely
seen as "pro-patent," particularly when contrasted with the Supreme
Court's "positively clear" standard.75 Nevertheless, the nexus
standard, as stated in Windsurfing, reveals inconsistencies in the
Federal Circuit's approach to weighing the importance of the
commercial success factor.76
In Windsurfing, the Federal Circuit upheld the patentees' claim
that their sailboard was nonobvious despite the challengers'
introduction of evidence that the success of the board was due to
70. Id.
71. Whelan, supra note 16, at 381.
72. Merges, supra note 33, at 824, (citing In re Heldt, 433 F.2d 808, 812-13 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
Merges and other commentators point out that the nexus test is lenient on patentees. See id. The
Supreme Court previously employed a scrutinize-with-care standard for nonobviousness, which
was far stricter than the subsequent nexus approach. See Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)(scrutinize-with-care).
73. See Merges, supra note 33, at 814-19. The nexus is important for the same reasons that
underlie the commercial success analysis. If success is not due to the inventiveness of the
solution, then the inference that others attempted but failed to reach the same solution does not
follow. Walker, supra note 41, at 188.
74. Id. at 177.
75. See Merges, supra note 33, at 824-25.
76. Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied 477 U.S. 905 (1986), suggests that the standard of proof of the nexus is not very high.
However, other opinions "have covered the waterfront" on the standard of proof issue. See
Walker, supra note 41, at 182. "It is difficult to glean anything other than the most amorphous of
rules from such a hodgepodge of holdings and such minimal guidance from the Federal Circuit."
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factors other than the patented features. 7 The court found a sufficient
nexus, relying on evidence that the board's success went "well
beyond" the effect of the non-patented features.78 In a case such as
this, the more commercially powerful inventor is protected. Claims
that the success of the product had merely to do with marketing,
distribution, and advertising will be closely scrutinized. In contrast, in
another case the Federal Circuit upheld a lack of nexus finding where
the challenger countered with substantial evidence that the product's
success was due to factors other than those leading to the patent.
79
These contrasting holdings raise a number of questions: What
precisely is the standard of proof required to establish a nexus? Who
bears the burden of proof? Furthermore, how does the small market
share entrepreneur establish a sufficient market share nexus when
infringed upon by a much larger competitor who can take advantage
of established market position or heavy advertising and promotion?8°
If market position, distribution, and advertising are not indicia of
obviousness for the patentee, then they will not serve to protect the
patentee who is challenged by a company that possesses all those
attributes. If a company has marketing savvy, a built-in distribution
channel, and advertising muscle, it can defeat a patentee in court
based on the "primary consideration" of commercial success, and the
individual inventor has no patent protection whatsoever.
In addition to affecting certain types of inventors, the emphasis
placed on commercial success will also affect certain types of
invention. Incremental inventions will thus be favored over
evolutionary inventions. Rapid commercial success disfavors so-called
revolutionary inventions, while encouraging the "find-a-need-and-fill-
it" type of incrementally progressive inventionP The market responds
77. Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 999-1000.
78. Id.
79. Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 315-17 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
80. See id. Those factors were held sufficient in Pentec to defeat a claim of commercial
success. Imagine a twist on the facts in Pentec combined with the holding in Windsurfing, where
the challenger claims no commercial success on the part of the patentee, and the challenger has
established market leadership and prominent advertising and promotion. In such a case, would
the Federal Circuit find a nexus or not? The answer is indeterminate.
81. Oddi, supra note 50, at 1128-37, proposes a special class of patent designed to encourage
and protect revolutionary patents. In addition, he points out that several countries, including
Germany and Japan, have patent systems designed to recognize the differences between
revolutionary and utility patents. Id.
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more quickly to the latter type, and production and marketing are
more readily used where there is an immediate "need."'
VIII
Burden Of Proof
Only little weight can be attributed to evidence of commercial
success if the patentee does not demonstrate a nexus between the
merits of the invention and its commercial success or licenses issued.
This suggests that while commercial success factors may help the small
inventor, he or she must bear the burden of proving a sufficient nexus.
"It is critical that commercial success be shown to be due to the unique
feature(s) of the claimed invention."'  This causal relationship is
essential to the whole nexus concept. A challenger may thus claim
that success is due to factors other than the "inventiveness" of the
product, shifting the burden to the patentee.
Where a patent examiner rejects a patent as obvious, the patentee
can appeal the decision to an administrative tribunal in the Patent
Office. The burden is on the Patent Office to establish a prima facie
case of obviousness. 5 The burden then shifts to the patentee to show
that the invention is nonobvious. 6 In situations where a private party
challenges a patent, although it appears that the burden falls on the
movant, the burden of proving nonobviousness remains with the
patentee throughoutY This is particularly true where the patentee
hopes to take advantage of commercial success considerations.18 Thus,
not only must the patentee prove the nonobviousness of his or her
invention upon application, but the patentee continues to bear that
82. Id.
83. Walker, supra note 41, at 190.
84. Id. at 191-92.
85. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
§§ 2100-89 (rev. Sept. 1995). If the patent examiner does not make a prima facie case of
obviousness, the applicant need not submit evidence of nonobviousness. The MANUAL suggests
that nonobviousness can be evidenced by "comparative data showing that the claimed invention
possesses improved properties not expected by prior art." Id. This is the sort of evidence
an applicant should expect to show. Less expected by the applicant is the need to show
commercial success, especially given that commercial considerations have been raised to the level
of the key factor in nonobviousness analysis.
86. See Walker, supra note 41, at 178.
87. See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530,1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
88. See Walker, supra note 41, at 179-80 (citing numerous cases from the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), the Federal Circuit's predecessor).
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burden throughout any patent challenge which may subsequently
arise.
Patentees must prove two things. First, they must prove that their
claimed inventions were commercially successful. 9 This showing
includes evidence of market share, growth, and displacement of prior
art products. Second, patentees must show that such success is due to
the merits of the claimed features, and is not due to extrinsic factors,
such as advertising, sales efforts, and distribution systems.9°
This burden of proof conceivably poses problems for the
individual inventor and start-up entrepreneur at two points in time.
First, it can create problems upon application, when the patentee must
show post facto success to justify the awarding of a patent to a product
he or she just invented and may be struggling to market. The statute
itself requires that the product have nonobvious differences with prior
art "at the time the invention was made."' If nonobviousness must
exist prior to the invention, in what way does a showing of post
invention commercial success prove the lack of obviousness? Either an
invention is obvious at the time it is conceived, or it is not. Subsequent
failure to capture a satisfactory market share, for reasons likely to
have little to do with the merits of the invention itself, should not be a
sufficient factor to invalidate a patent that is otherwise nonobvious.9
With the burden shifting to the inventor after the Patent Office has
made a prima facie showing of insufficient commercial success, 93 the
89. Whelan, supra note 16, at 369.
90. Id. Successful advertising and promotion can make the showing of nexus harder for the
unwary patentee. Walker, supra note 41, at 190-91. Evidence of commercial success has been
insufficient to overcome a claim of obviousness where the court was unable to distinguish the
effects of claimed features from unclaimed features. Bourns, Inc. v. United States, 187 U.S.P.Q.
174, 180 (Ct. Cl. 1976)(finding commercial success due to a number of factors). The difficulty in
attributing success to claimed features appears to be mitigated by later decisions such as Panduit
Corp. v. Dennisan Manufacturing Co., 774 F.2d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and Windsurfing
International Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994)(emphasis added).
92. See Whelan, supra note 16, at 381. Commercial success, being an objective criterion, is
not relevant to the state of mind of the inventor at the time of the inventive act. The language of
the statute seems to call for a subjective inquiry into the state of mind of the inventor of ordinary
skill at the time the claimed invention was made. Therein lies a contradiction in jurisprudential
approach which has been exacerbated by the Federal Circuit's growing emphasis on commercial
success at the expense of the subjective Graham factors (primarily the level of "ordinary skill" in
that art).
93. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDoUE,supra note 85, at § 2143, sets forth the
requirements for a prima facie case: 1) there must be some suggestion to modify the reference; 2)
there must be a reasonable expectation of success; and 3) the prior art must suggest all the claim
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inventor is placed in the strange position of having to prove that his or
her product failed to achieve "commercial success" for reasons
unrelated to the inventiveness of that product.
The second point at which the burden of proof poses problems for
the small market share inventor is when the product is copied and the
patent is challenged. The patentee must again resort to post facto
justifications to defend the initial inventiveness of his or her product,
often against a competitor who has vastly more commercial power.
This creates a disincentive for larger companies to engage in vigorous
R & D.4 Instead, "hyeniform" companies can prey on the fruits of
the imagination of the undercapitalized, copy the product, take over a
huge portion of the market for reasons unrelated to the originality of
the invention, and then when faced in court, be given the luxury of
forcing the "little guy" not only to prove the nonobviousness of the
invention, but to do it on commercial terms."
Ix
Hypothetical Third-Party Patent Challenge
Suppose an inventor creates a product and attempts to market it
through the small-scale channels available to a start-up entrepreneur:
a limited initial manufacturing run, gradual and primarily local
expansion of distribution, word of mouth advertising, and so on.97 A
big manufacturer, who has obtained a large market share through
sales of existing products, but who has not made great strides in
technological advancement, copies the inventor's product, then
challenges the patent. The district court examines the statutory and
Graham primary factors and finds the product passes those tests.
limitations. The references must suggest the claimed invention or the examiner must explain why
the combination of the teachings is proper.
94. See JACOB SCHMOOKLER, PATENTS, INVENTION, AND ECONOMIC CHANGE: DATA AND
SELECTED ESSAYS 36-46 (Zvi Grilliches & Leonard Hurwicz, eds., Harvard U. Press 1972). This
sort of disincentive is discouraged by antitrust law, and presumably, by patent law as well. But
see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1966), for a historical perspective on Jefferson's
attitude toward patent monopolies.
95. In the manner of hyenas, viz., cowardly yet carnivorous.
96. L.e., on the "big guy's own turf."
97. Note that the costs of R & D, manufacturing, and marketing are not the only financial
hurdles facing the small inventor. The costs of applying for and maintaining a patent are not
trivial either. Patent applications can cost an average of $3,000 in attorney's fees, and can cost an
additional $6,000 in maintenance fees over the life of the patent. Susan Kostal, Law Change May
Hurt Small Inventors, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 28, 1991, at 7. If an inventor must spend the money to
obtain a patent before testing it in the marketplace, financial incentive to patent suffers. Id.
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Nevertheless, the court must then turn to commercial success, which
may trump all the other primary factors. Next, suppose the inventor's
market share is small, with low raw sales.18 In addition, a big company
can claim that its commercial success is due to factors other than the
patented features. In this way, the company minimizes the
nonobviousness of the invention. The challenger can say to the court,
in effect, "Look, the reason our product is successful has to do with
our marketing savvy and distribution. It has nothing to do with the
inventiveness of the disputed features. Those features were obvious.
Had they not been obvious, but instead had been revolutionary, the
inventor would have had runaway success with his product. Since he
has not, there is no nexus and the patent should be invalidated."' 9 As a
consequence, the inventor loses patent protection by the very same
standards thought to be pro-patent. The big company, in turn, is




Through changes to the definition of the commercial success
factor, the Federal Circuit has "transformed commercial success from
a tiebreaker to a virtual trump card."' ' The Federal Circuit has added
a further layer of uncertainty by undertaking increased factual inquiry
as well.1 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1' the court of
appeal is expected to review facts only when they fall within the
98. Secondary considerations such as commercial success may become evident only years
after the product has been commercialized. This undercuts the prospect function of the patent
system. A key feature of prospect theory is lowered transaction costs. The possibility of wasteful
duplicative research is increased. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1097 n.276.
99. Patents for inventions that have not been commercially successful may also have a
social benefit. Id.
100. In addition, as a practical matter, the patentee may face judicial hostility that he or she
is trying to create a patent monopoly, while the competitor is engaging in good, old-fashioned
American capitalism. See Tom Arnold & Floyd Nation, Proving Section 103 Nonobviousness 4:1-
9, in NONOBVIOUSNEss-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon, ed.
1980).
101. See id. at 8:1. Arnold and Nation note that the exceptions to nonobviousness have
swallowed the congressional policy behind section 103, which was to induce R & D expenditure
to develop protectable products.
102. See Merges, supra note 33, at 827.
103. See generally Bradley Lane, Nonobviousness from the Perspective of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a), 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1157 (1987).
104. FED. R. Ctv. PRoc. 52(a).
19961
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
clearly erroneous standard. The Federal Circuit instead has engaged in
extensive fact-finding as to a product's commercial success, even
where the lower court had considered that factor and made factual
findings.1" The Federal Circuit "often rolls up its sleeves and
reexamines all the facts of a case related to obviousness."' Lurking
beneath this new-found enthusiasm for de novo factual review is the
question of the appellate court's competence to conduct such an
inquiry in a technology-intensive field in the absence of testimony and
exhibits1 7
XI
Economic Ramifications of a Shifting or fl-Defined Standard of
Proof of Nonobviousness
Given inconsistent judicial standards, there is considerable
uncertainty for the individual inventor who seeks to patent and market
his or her invention. Where such uncertainty exists, a disincentive for
individual inventors to market their products is created. I The nexus
standard shifts emphasis to the aggregation of resources brought to
bear on the opportunity for technological innovation."° Although the
nexus standard encourages efficient innovation, it conversely fosters
greater expenditures toward commercial development.110 The
disadvantage of encouraging commercial development is twofold.
First, it may come at the expense of R & D. Second, significant
commercial development resources are unavailable to the small
inventor.
The nexus standard represents a shift of resources away from the
inventive act toward the commercial act. Those benefiting the most
are companies with greater commercial resources. Those hurt the most
are highly inventive individuals or small start-up companies with
limited (or non-existent) commercial resources.
Much of the American cultural mythos is built upon the idea of
the individual inventor who labors away anonymously in a garage until
105. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1569 (1987)(holding
nonobviousness inquiry must be made "in light of all probative evidence.").
106. Desmond, supra note 39, at 481.
107. "The Federal Circuit's insistence on reviewing both PTO and district court obviousness
determinations de novo only further increases the inherent unpredictability in this area." Michel,
supra note 13, at 1241.
108. See SCHMOOKLER, supra note 94.
109. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1099.
110. Id.
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finally unleashing a revolutionary new product on the world. From
Thomas Jefferson n x and Ben Franklin,"2 to Thomas Edison and
Alexander Graham Bell,1 4 to Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs,115 the
idea of the garage tinkerer being the backbone of American ingenuity
is irrefutable and immutable. This archetype of American ingenuity
and independence is threatened by the uncertainty created by the
courts owing to their elevation of commercial success to the primary
factors in securing and defending a patent. The resulting uncertainty
will hinder American inventiveness and innovation in a shrinking
global market.
The best solution to this uncertainty would be for the Federal
Circuit more clearly to lay out the permissible grounds of the
nonobviousness inquiry. If the Federal Circuit defined the scope of the
commercial success factor more carefully-the burdens of proof, the
standard of factual review, the role commercial success plays in
relation to the Graham primary factors-then the district courts and
the Patent Office could apply the standard more consistently. This
consistency would benefit the inventor and the marketplace. By
eliminating the existing disincentives to conduct research created by
inconsistent adjudication of patent claims, R & D expenditures could
be refocused on technological innovation, a result Congress intended
to promote when it passed section 103. Finally, if the Federal Circuit
proves unable or unwilling to impose consistent standards, the
Supreme Court should intervene to establish those standards. For too
long the Court has acted as though the Graham factors were still
consistently being applied. The rigid formalism and patent-hostile
stance of Graham are out of date. The Court should take the
opportunity to make the decisions of the district courts and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit consistent and to
reexamine the constitutional and congressional purposes constituting
the heart of the nonobviousness requirement.
111. The folding chair.
112. Experiments in electricity.
113. The light bulb, the phonograph, and a vast array of other innovations.
114. The telephone.
115. The Apple computer. (This note, alas, was written in WordPerfect 5.1 for MS DOS on a
386 SX clone. I wonder how far Steve and Steve would get with their Apple computer patent if
they were to try to break into the market today and achieve commercial success sufficient to
show that the Apple is nonobvious.)
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